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While Germany’s unconditional surrender to Allied forces on May 9th, 1945 marked the
conclusion of physical conflict on Western Front, this transfer of power at the end of World War
II created a new conflict of an administrative nature. As victors, American, British, French, and
Soviet officials were responsible for the development of a system to address the crimes of Nazi
leaders. While international law—and popular opinion in several Allied countries—favored
executions without trials, prominent leaders including Joseph Stalin and Justice Robert Jackson
lobbied for a more equitable process.1 Allied leaders met in August 1945 to sign the London
Charter, a document which established an International Military Tribunal to try Nazi leaders for
“Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity.”2 The resulting trials, held in
Nuremberg, Germany, processed twenty-two prominent Nazi leaders, leading to the execution of
twelve, the imprisonment of seven, and the acquittal of three.3 The Nuremberg Trials provided an
immediate resolution to the issue of Nazi war crimes, yet their status as a novel form of
international trial also spurred a lasting legal controversy. Citizens questioned the legitimacy of
seemingly unprecedented legal proceedings, accusing the Allies of enforcing victor’s justice in
order to justify revenge on wartime enemies. Others asserted that the London Charter represented
an ex post facto law which retroactively punished Nazi leaders for previously legal actions.
These critics specifically targeted the concept of “crimes against humanity,” a charge which
referred to destructive actions taken by German officials against the German people. This
category of wartime wrongdoing may not previously have been codified into international law,
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but its incorporation into the London Charter did not constitute the introduction of new legal
doctrine. Rather, the explicit inclusion of crimes against humanity into the charges at Nuremberg,
precipitated by the legal theories of Sheldon Grueck, represented a logical culmination of both
long-standing wartime etiquette and codified humanitarian law.
The earliest standards for wartime behavior have their roots in multinational events
centuries prior to the two World Wars. From 1618 to 1648, forces representing a large proportion
of European nations participated in the Thirty Years War. During the war, only personal morality
governed the behavior of soldiers. The state of Germany after the conclusion of the war provided
compelling testimony to the lawlessness this lack of regulation encouraged—countryside battle
sites were left destroyed and the population of Germany reduced from an original twenty million
to an estimated sixteen to seventeen million.4 The political consequences of the war included a
decrease in the power of the Holy Roman Empire; individual nations attempted to take advantage
of this power vacuum by building larger armies to increase their own military strength.
Soldiering soon became a profession, and this increased volume of full-time fighters made strict
organization necessary for productivity. Thus, both humanitarian and logistical concerns
motivated European leaders after 1648 to establish regulated militaries. In addition to superficial
changes in organization, including the establishment of standard national uniforms, leaders set
standards for behavior and created procedures and personnel positions for the enforcement of
these regulations. Nations established customs for the treatment of civilians during conflict, and
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while not yet incorporated into international law, these standards came to be viewed as
“sensible” military practice.5
Enlightenment-era philosophy also supported the concept of civilian immunity in times
of international conflict. Dutch legal philosopher Hugo Grotius authored his 1625 work De Jure
Belli ac Pacis (On the Laws of War and Peace), in the midst of the Thirty Years War. Grotius
turned to Roman military history and Christian religious doctrine to argue for limitations on
wartime violence, including “unnecessary violence in the taking of towns” leading to the loss of
“great numbers of the innocent.”6 In 1762, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s On Social Contract asserted
that war represents a conflict between states rather than individuals. Because the individual is not
a party to military conflict, and war only justifies destructive actions which serve a purpose in
the dispute, Rousseau argued that “a just prince ... respects the purpose and property of private
individuals” and those not acting as “instruments of the enemy.”7 Although this soldier-civilian
distinction may have developed first in scholarly circles, European military leaders eventually
embraced this new military philosophy. French foreign minister Charles Maurice de TalleyrandPérigord shared a paraphrased version of the pertinent passage of On Social Contract with
Napoleon in an 1806 letter; upon a later 1871 invasion of France, the Prussian king announced
his intention to oppose French soldiers rather than the French people.8
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Although both philosophers and military leaders worldwide discouraged violence against
noncombatants, no codified national or international law included this precept until two military
conflicts during the nineteenth century. During the U.S. Civil War, Columbia professor Francis
Lieber prepared “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,”
later known as the Lieber Code, to serve as a handbook for the Union Army. This document,
which outlined the rights of both combatants and civilians, represented the first codification of
humanitarian military law. Notable in the U.S. Judge Advocate General’s interpretation of the
code is a rejection of any ex post facto accusations from soldiers accused of violating its
regulations. Referring to the consensus in customary law against the crimes outlined in the
document, the Judge Advocate General characterized the code as “merely a publication and
affirmance of the law as it had previously existed.”9 Thus, while the Lieber Code was novel in its
status as a written document, the familiar nature of the ideas it represented justified its
enforcement. While the code applied only to the U.S. military, Richard Baxter suggests that this
first codification of war law inspired the development of similar codified regulations in multiple
European nations within the next century.10 Perhaps also contributing to the push for firm
military laws were the Crimean and Franco-Austrian Wars, fought on the European continent
several years prior to the U.S. Civil War. Because no laws existed to ensure the protection of
medical staff on the battlefield, doctors could not properly assist wounded soldiers during these
two conflicts. During one of the earliest international conferences on war law, twelve European
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nations signed the first Geneva Convention, which provided the privileges of neutrality to
hospital employees, ambulance staff, and any civilians who chose to assist the wounded.11
The Hague Convention of 1899 represented the final development in international war
law prior to World War I. Drawing heavily from precepts first outlined in the Lieber Code, the
“Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land” ensured additional
protections to civilians in war zones. The convention forbade collective punishment, the
establishment of penalties against the general population for a crime for which only select
members are responsible. Other articles of the document denounced attacks against undefended
towns and the pillaging of captured areas.12 Signatories to the convention included major North
American, European, and Asian forces. Despite this broad coalition, Telford Taylor suggests that
the convention’s failure to define any means of enforcement for the regulations it set diminished
its practical impact. However, similar to the Lieber Code in both its content and influence, the
Hague Convention did spur individual nations to incorporate humanitarian concepts into their
own military legal codes.13
The violence of World War I provided the first major test of the national and international
war laws developed in the previous two centuries for the protection of noncombatants. Several
developments in military technology facilitated violence against civilians beyond the scope of
the Hague protections. Germans began Zeppelin air raids over London, a technically “defended”
town therefore excluded from the Hague protection, killing over two hundred civilians in 1915
11
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alone.14 Germans also initiated unannounced attacks on merchant ships in the waters surrounding
the British Isles using new U-boat submarines; the Hague Convention of 1899 did not prohibit
such attacks unless the targeted ship served as a hospital. In eastern Europe, leaders of the
Ottoman Empire, a German ally, pursued a racial cleansing agenda strikingly similar to Nazi
activities which would occur decades later. Fueled by a long-standing conflict between the
Christian Armenians and the Muslim government, Ottoman leaders cited perceived Armenian
sympathy with the Russian enemy to justify state-sponsored genocide. Mass executions and
unhealthy conditions in concentration camps reduced the Ottoman-Armenian population from
approximately 2.5 to 1.5 million.15 While Allied officials recognized the extent of this violence,
condemning Ottoman actions as “crimes against humanity and civilization,” the narrow scope of
the Hague Convention again rendered international law powerless in preventing further
damage.16 Because the Armenians were Ottoman citizens, and not a separate belligerent nation,
no Hague protections applied to them.
While some instances of German aggression circumvented the limitations of the Hague
Convention, others more clearly violated international law. Reports indicated that German armies
pillaged the city of Louvain in neutral Belgium and took civilian hostages in other areas;
Europeans began to refer to the invasion and occupation as “the rape of Belgium”.1718 A
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commission of the Paris Peace Conference tasked with evaluating the legality of Central Power
actions issued a 1919 report which asserted that German forces had violated the laws of war and
called for an international tribunal to determine the guilt of the most powerful military leaders.
The first international war crimes court may have occurred the next year if not for the objections
of U.S. president Woodrow Wilson, who feared that one such court would represent a form of
victor’s justice. Instead, the Treaty of Versailles arraigned German Kaiser Wilhelm II not for war
crimes but for a vague “offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties”19 The
treaty called for military tribunals to try all suspected German offenders, but the German
government eventually convinced the Allies to permit the German Supreme Court to hear the
cases. The 1921 Leipzig trials evolved into a “great fiasco,” with many acquitted and those
convicted allowed to neglect their sentences.20 The Kaiser, who sought asylum in Holland in
1918, avoided the trials entirely. Similarly ineffective were the Ottoman Court Martial Trials of
1919 to 1920, ordered by the British during their occupation of Constantinople after the
conclusion of the war. The indictment against top Ottoman officials supported government
involvement in the Armenian massacres with forty-two different documents.21 Despite this
compelling collection of incriminating evidence, Winston Churchill agreed to abandon the trials
in exchange for the freedom of British prisoners of war held in Turkey.
The Leipzig and Ottoman Trials failed to punish German and Armenian officials for
wartime violence against civilians, but succeeded in publicizing the extent of the atrocities
19
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permissible under existing international statutes. The trial of Lieutenant Carl Neumann, a
German U-boat commander, received coverage in numerous American newspapers.22 23 24 25
Although the Leipzig court acquitted the defendant because he had followed superior orders, the
officer revealed that the Germans had given “explicit orders to sink British hospital ships.”26 The
exposure similar acts of aggression received in the press, coupled with the failure of the Leipzig
and Ottoman Trials to effectively punish the perpetrators, exposed a need for additional legal
protections for noncombatants in future conflicts. In response, an international group of delegates
at the 1922 Washington Conference drafted, yet failed to force into adoption, an agreement
against bombings intended primarily to inspire civilian fear. In an attempt to prevent casualties
from unannounced submarine attacks, the eleven signatories to the 1930 London Treaty agreed to
prohibit the destruction of merchant vessels unless the attacking captain gave passengers time to
escape to safety.
Just as World War I technology precipitated violence against civilians beyond the scope
of the Hague protections, a change in German military goals led to unprecedented brutalities
during World War II. Taylor argues that while the German leaders of World War I targeted
civilians in the pursuit of military victory, the Nazi leaders of World War II endeavored to
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oppress select ethnic groups with violence unconnected to military goals.27 The publication of
the Nuremberg Laws, which revoked the German citizenship of Jewish residents and prohibited
intermarriage between Jews and Germans, presents evidence of this disconnect. Announced at a
1935 Nazi Party rally, prior to the start of official military conflict in 1939, the code suggests that
Nazi oppression of Jews was politically motivated and not a means to any larger wartime goal.
The brutalities of 1938 Kristallnacht, which included the murder of at least ninety-one Jews and
the placement of approximately thirty thousand in concentration camps before the start of World
War II, similarly present Nazi anti-Semitism as unrelated to the pursuit of military victory.28 Nazi
abuses against civilians continued into World War II with the German occupation of Poland.
Leaders forced the Jewish population to move into ghettos outside of main cities, while,
according to a report by Polish Primate August Cardinal Hlond, other Nazi officials were tasked
with the execution of two hundred and fourteen Polish Catholic priests.29 Statements issued by
numerous world leaders indicate that Allied officials were aware from the beginning of the war
of Nazi violence against noncombatants. The Polish government, existing at the time in exile in
London, first suggested the punishment of German war criminals in 1940. The following year,
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill issued statements condemning Nazi murders
of “scores of innocent hostages” and promising unspecified “retribution.”30 The first official
Allied document on war crimes came in 1942 as a product of the Inter-Allied Commission on the
Punishment of War Crimes. The commission’s St. James’ Declaration stated that the Allied
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powers intended to systematically and justly punish those involved in the perpetration of wartime
crimes. Yet notable in the commission’s justification of this intention is its appeal not to codified
international law, but to “the sense of justice of the civilized world.”31 As Arieh Kochavi notes,
existing international law did not include provisions to support punishment for many instances of
Nazi violence against civilians. The prohibitions of the Hague Convention applied only to
violence against citizens of another belligerent nation; the document thus did not apply to
brutalities perpetrated by Nazis prior to the war or against German citizens. Allied leaders did
view these actions as blatantly wrong, but the commission’s desire to pursue punishment
“through the channel of organized justice” meant that Allied lawyers would need to condemn
these crimes against humanity using concepts from existing international law and legal
philosophy. 32
Harvard law professor Sheldon Glueck provided this critical link between existing legal
custom and the seemingly novel concept of crimes against humanity. Glueck worked as a
translator during German interrogations prior to the Leipzig trials; the failure of these judicial
proceedings likely familiarized him with the shortcomings of existing international law. A legal
realist, Glueck viewed law as a body of rules whose interpretation could vary based on political
and moral concerns. Thus, both Glueck’s background and liberal legal philosophy may have
informed his decision to express support for the legal validity of crimes against humanity during
his 1943 Harvard seminar on war crimes.33 Referring to centuries of legal precedent in both
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national and international law against harming civilians, Glueck asserted that “the laws of
civilized humanity” justified an explicit condemnation of German crimes against humanity in
international law. According to Glueck, the Allies could reasonably assume that, as citizens and
members of the military, Nazi criminals had knowledge of these common laws prohibiting
crimes such as murder and torture.34 While Glueck recognized that the prohibition of statesponsored violence against a country’s own citizens was unprecedented in these laws, he
believed it unreasonable to base the legality of violence singularly on the nationality of the
victims. Glueck also cited basic morality in his argument, claiming that because Nazi leaders
must have understood “full well that murder is murder” before committing acts of brutality
against civilians, indicting these leaders for crimes against humanity would not constitute the
enforcement of ex post facto law.
While Glueck did teach and write extensively on the subject of World War II war crimes,
his presence at a number of meetings tasked with the formulation of the Nuremberg Charter
principles most directly suggests the influence of his legal philosophy. Glueck testified before the
United Stated Congress on the nature of war crimes, then in 1942 served as a corresponding
member of the London International Commission on the Trial of War Criminals. In 1945, Glueck
attended negotiations on the London Charter itself, serving as the advisor to U.S. Justice Robert
Jackson. Shortly after, Article 6(c) of the London Charter officially defined “Crimes Against
Humanity” as a crime under the International Military Tribunal.35 In justifications of the
inclusion of this new charge, legal leaders at the Nuremberg Trials further underscored the
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influence of Glueck’s legal philosophy. Both Justice Jackson, who became the chief prosecutor
for the United States, and Hartley Shawcross, the British chief prosecutor, echoed elements of
Glueck’s legal theory when defending the legitimacy of crimes against humanity. In a
correspondence to Allied leaders, Jackson appealed to Glueck’s concept of the consensus against
basic crimes in civilized society, referring to Nazi crimes against citizens as “acts ... regarded as
criminal since the time of Cain.”36 Offering a closing argument during the trials, Shawcross cited
Glueck’s belief that the nationality of a victim of violence should not alter the legal
permissibility of brutality.37
The London Charter’s prohibition of crimes against humanity drew from centuries of
customary and codified legal precedents protecting civilians during times of war. While new to
the body of official international law, this condemnation represented the next logical step in a
pattern of war law development spanning several centuries. From the emergence of larger armies
after the Thirty Years War to the development of new weapons technology during World War II,
each advance in military power made necessary a commensurate increase in the ability of
international law to limit this power. Viewed in this context, Glueck’s decision to make the minor
logical leap from previous humanitarian law to the legal legitimacy of crimes against humanity
appears as the most desirable of two undesirable choices: to face accusations of enforcing ex post
facto law, or to allow Nazi actions unprecedented in their brutality to go unchecked. In a sense,
all international war law, which limits national sovereignty to prevent unregulated violence,
represents the lesser of two evils. While the inclusion of crimes against humanity into
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international law at Nuremberg aroused controversy in the years immediately following the trial,
legal experts nevertheless included the concept in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court. Because it attempts to impose moral regulations on an inherently immoral
endeavor, international war law can never reach perfection. But as the one hundred and sixty
signatories to the Rome Statute affirmed in 1998, even controversial developments can
eventually constitute significant improvements.
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